Brad Bird: The mistake that a lot of people make
is thinking that you can force ideas to come
You can't, really
All that you can do is observed what
kind of environment put you in a creative state of mind
and to create that environment
source: Ratatouille (2007 film, Disney PiXAR)
2007 DVD release
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• create the environment in which the stuff we did was possible.
Theodore Rockwell., The rickover efffect : how one man made a difference / 1992,
p.377
“But you've got a number of former nuclear submarine sailors here”, said Mandil. “Can't they help keep things on the track? At least they should know what you're talking about.”
“Sure. If we lead properly, they'll follow. But they won't initiate basic changes to the whole system. You can't expect them to. That's where I need help from you guys. You know as well as I do that Rick didn't create all the procedures and systems and hardware by himself. We did it, and we did it in our own image, to a great extent. What he did was to create the environment in which the stuff we did was possible. More than that, he made what we did inevitable. First, by hiring the kind of people he did, by how he trained them, and by setting standards. Then what we all created was a natural consequence. We've got to figure out how to do that here. Then these guys will do their part.”
(The rickover efffect : how one man made a difference / Theodore Rockwell., 1. rickover, hyman george., 2. nuclear submarines ── united states ── history.
3. admirals ── united states ── biography., 4. united states., navy──biography,
V63.R54R63 1992, 359.3'2574'092--dc20, united states naval institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1992 )
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Theodore Rockwell., The rickover efffect : how one man made a difference / 1992,
p.120
Once we had established that level of excellence as a pattern and a precedent, it was easier to carry it over to the surface Navy, and then into the civilian power industry, than it ever would have been to start it there.
p.120
In a similar vein, it would have been almost impossible to get any shipyard up to that level if we had had to do it entirely within the yard. But the land prototype in Idaho offered an almost monastic ambiance where the extraordinary could be established, away from the peer pressure of the normal shipyard operations, and then transplanted once it had taken root.
(The rickover efffect : how one man made a difference / Theodore Rockwell., 1. rickover, hyman george., 2. nuclear submarines ── united states ── history.
3. admirals ── united states ── biography., 4. united states., navy──biography,
V63.R54R63 1992, 359.3'2574'092--dc20, united states naval institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1992 )
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根回し (Nemawashi)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nemawashi
Nemawashi (根回し) in Japanese means an informal process of quietly laying the foundation for some proposed change or project, by talking to the people concerned, gathering support and feedback, and so forth. It is considered an important element in any major change, before any formal steps are taken, and successful nemawashi enables changes to be carried out with the consent of all sides.
Nemawashi literally translates as "going around the roots", from 根 (ne, root) and 回す (mawasu, to go around [something]). Its original meaning was literal: digging around the roots of a tree, to prepare it for a transplant. This process involves bringing the dirt from the new location, and introducing it to the tree, before the transplant, so the tree can grow accustomed to the new environment before it gets there.
Nemawashi is often cited as an example of a Japanese word which is difficult to translate effectively, because it is tied so closely to Japanese culture itself, although it is often translated as "laying the groundwork."
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• create the conditions for transformation.
• management doesn't change culture.
• Management invites the workforce itself to change the culture.
Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., Who says elephants can't dance? : inside IBM's historic turnaround, 2002
pp.185—186
The pursuit of excellence over time became an obsession with perfection. It resulted in a stultifying culture and a spider's web of checks, approvals, and validation that slowed decision making to a crawl. When I arrived at IBM, new mainframes were announced every 4-to-5 years. Today they are launched, on average, every 18 months (with excellent quality, I might add). I can understand the joke that was going around IBM in the early 1990s: "Products aren't launched at IBM. They escape."
p.187
Stepping up to the challenge
Frankly, if I could have chosen not to tackle the IBM culture head-on, I probably wouldn't have. For one thing, my bias coming in was toward strategy, analysis, and measurement. I'd already been successful with those, and like anyone, I was inclined to stick with what had worked for me earlier in my career. Once I found a handful of smart people, I knew we could take a fresh look at the business and make good strategic calls or invest in new businesses or get the cost structure in shape.
In comparison, changing the attitude and behaviour of hundreds of thousands of people is very, very hard to accomplish. Business schools don't teach you how to do it. You can't lead the revolution from the splendid isolation of corporate headquarters. You can't simply give a couple speeches or write a new credo for the company and declare that the new culture had take hold. You can't mandate it, can't engineer it.
What you CAN do is create the conditions for transformation. You can provide incentives. You can define the marketplace realities and goals. But then you have to trust. In fact, in the end, management doesn't change culture. Management invites the workforce itself to change the culture.
p.188
It was counter-intuitive, centered around social cues and emotion rather than reason.
Tough as that was, we had to suck it up and take on the task of changing the culture, given what was at stake. I knew it would take at least five years. (In that I underestimated.) And I knew the leader of the revolution had to be ME——I had to commit to thousands of hours of personal activity to pull off the change. I would have to be up-front and outspoken about what I was doing. I needed to get my leadership team to join me. We all had to talk openly and directly about culture, behaviour, and beliefs——we would not be subtle.
p.77
... The sine qua non [Latin, without which not; an essential condition; indispensable thing; absolute prerequisite] of any successful corporate transformation is public acknowledgment of the existence of a crisis. If employees do not believe a crisis exists, they will not make the sacrifices that are necessary to change. Nobody likes change. Whether you are a senior executive or an entry-level employee, change represents uncertainty and, potentially, pain.
So there must be a crisis, and it is the job of the CEO to define and communicate that crisis, its magnitude, it severity, and its impact. Just as important, the CEO must also be able to communicate how to end the crisis——the new strategy, the new company model, the new culture.
All of this takes enormous commitment from the CEO to communicate, communicate, and communicate some more. No institutional transformation takes place, I believe, without a multi-year commitment by the CEO to put himself or herself constantly in front of employees and speak in plain, simple, compelling language that drives conviction and action throughout the organizaiton.
(Gerstner, Louis V., copyright © 2002, HD9696.2.U64 I2545 2002, 004.'068——dc21)
(Who says elephants can't dance? : inside IBM's historic turnaround / Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., 1. international business machines corporation——management, 2. international business machines corporation——history, 3. computer industry——united states——history, 4. electronic office machine industry——united states——history, 5. corporate turnarounds——united states——case studies, )
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Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge, 1995 [ ]
p.29, p.272, p.310
chapter 2, core rigidities
While it is difficult to change a company that is struggling, it is next to impossible to change a company that is showing all the outward signs of success. Without the spur of a crisis or a period of great stress, most organization——like most most people——are incapable of changing the habits and attitudes of a lifetime.
——John F. McDonnell
McDonnell Douglas Corporation 1
p.272
1. McDonnell 1994, 9.
p.310
McDonnell, John F. 1994. Speech to CEO Conference, 26 April, Amsterdam. Quoted in Executive Speaker 15 (July): 9.
(Leonard-Barton, Dorothy, copyright © 1995, HD30.2.L46 1995, 658.4'038——dc20)
(Wellsprings of Knowledge : building and sustaining the sources of innovation / Dorothy Leonard-Barton, 1. information technology——management, 2. information resources management, 3. management information systems, )
(p.29, p.272, p.310)
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Ed Catmull [ ]
recorded January 31, 2007
uploaded on Jul 28, 2009
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k2h2lvhzMDc
13:17
"... because they love alot of things, they were willing to put up with stuff they didn't like. And I think this is one of the fundamental problems with company: Success hides problems. It happens to alot of us in our personal lives with our health. When we are healthy, we doing alot things that are bad for us, but our health let us get away with doing stuff that are bad for us, and years later the logic doesn't hold up, but we do that. It happens with a lot of companies. It happens with states, local, and national governments. When you are healthy and you have got the resources, you don't need to address the problems. ... they were actually very healthy and very strong. The problems were there and they did not have to look at them at that time. They let the success, and they were successful at that time, they let the success get in the way of diving deep and finding the problems.";--Ed Catmull-Pixar, keep your crises small, youtube.com
14:15
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