The council on foreign relation (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by maintaining a diverse membership, with special programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy leaders; convening meetings at its headquarters in New York and in Washington, D.C., and other cities where senior government officials, member of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come together with CFR members to discuss and debate major international issues; supporting a studies program that fosters independent research, enabling CFR scholars to produce articles, reports, and books and hold roundtables that analyze foreign policy issues and make concrete policy recommendations; publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent journal on international affairs and U.S. foreign policy; sponsoring Independent Task Forces that produce reports with both finding and policy prescriptions on the most important foreign policy topics; and providing up-to-date information and analysis about world events and American foreign policy on its website, www.cfr.org.
The Council of Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government. All views expressed in its publications and on its website are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.
2010
“”─“”‘’•─“”
____________________________________
• “the morality of speculation in developing countries: If currencies crashed, millions of innocents would be forced into desperate poverty.19”, Sebastian Mallaby., More money than god : hedge funds and the making of a new elite, 2010., pp.201-202;
Sebastian Mallaby., More money than god : hedge funds and the making of a new elite, 2010.
currency of Thailand
pp.198-207
pp.197-198
To run these new start-ups, Soros recruited new talent, including a Princeton-trained economist named Arminio Fraga.
When the two men met in early 1993, Fraga, a Brazilian, had just left a position as a deputy governor at his country's central bank.
Within a few days, Soros had offered him a partnership.
p.198
For the next four years at Soros, Fraga performed the benign function of hedge funds: to finance emerging economies that were shunned by traditional investors. He bought the bonds of big Latin countries such as Brazil and Venezuela; he branched out into exotica such as Moroccan loans; he bought shares in Brazilian utilities, which were absurbly cheap by international standards.
p.198
Then in late 1996 Fraga attended a talk by Stan Fischer, the number two at the International Monetary Fund. The mood was mostly upbeat: Mexico's currency had recovered from its crisis, and emerging markets were booming. Still, somebody asked Fischer the question “Who do you think is the next Mexico?”
p.198
“I'm not sure there's another one out there at the moment”, Fischer answered. “But I do see some imbalances in Asia. That might be interesting to look at.”
That comment, Fraga recalled later, “put a little light in my mind”.10 A few weeks afterward, Fraga read a joint IMF-Federal Reserve paper titled “The Twin Crises”, which laid out in terrifying detail how a currency collapse could interact with the collapse of a banking system.11
p.198
Casting his mind back to Fischer's remarks, Fraga approached Druckenmiller.
“Do you mind if I go and take a look at what is going on in Asia?” he asked him.
“Sure”, came the answer. “Go”.12
p.198, p.199
in Jaunary 1997, Fraga landed in Thailand
local officials, company executives, and economists,
the country fitted the double-crisis model laid out in the IMF-Fed paper.
If the foreigners tired of lending to Thailand, the country would have to export enough not only to cover its import bill but also to repay outsiders. To boost exports and cut imports, the Thai baht would have to fall ── sharply.
p.199
The tipping point for Fraga came during a visit to the Bank of Thailand. Together with David Kowitz, Soros's expert on Asian equities, and Rodney Jones, an economist who worked for Soros in Hong Kong, Fraga was granted an audience with a high-ranking official at the central bank.
p.199
Invoking his own experience as the deputy governor of Brazil's central bank, Fraga offered some thoughts on the dilemma that Thailand confronted:
p.200
Fraga had a mild manner, and his Brazilian background helped; he seemed more like a benign emerging-market peer than a menacing Wall Street predator. So the official looked at Fraga and gave him an answer that was at once honest and naïve.
p.200
The official repeated his statement, and the Soros team got what it was looking for. Their host had told them that he knew the game was up: He had confessed and reconfessed his nakedness. Whatever the official pronouncements on Thailand's commitment to its exchange-rate peg, it was only a matter of time before the baht was devalued.
p.200
After a stop in South Korea, Fraga returned to New York and reported back to Druckenmiller.
p.200
The big man listened to Fraga's story and quickly approved a trade, and over the space of a few days in late January, the Soros team sold short about $2 billion worth of the Thai currency.14
The selling was both a prediction of a crisis and a trigger that could bring it on:
p.201
The Soros team had taken out baht loans of six months' duration and had locked in the low interest rates that had existed before the government hiked them. Secure in their positions, Druckenmiller and Fraga could afford to wait until the end of July for the inevitable to happen.16
pp.201-202
the morality of speculation in developing countries: If currencies crashed, millions of innocents would be forced into desperate poverty.19
p.203
The new position still represented only a third of the Soros funds' capital, a fraction of what Druckenmiller could have sold if he had leveraged up aggressively. But now Druckenmiller was no longer the only player in the game; Thai investors were leading the charge out of the baht, and other hedge funds were following. Paul Tudor Jones, who spoke with Druckenmiller several times each day, was quick to put on a trade, as did several of the other macro funds from the tight-knit group around him. The biggest player after Druckenmiller was probably Julian Robertson's Tiger, which built a short position in the baht that eventually came to $2 billion.21
p.204
On May 15, the day after Druckenmiller upped the ante, the Thai authorities forbade all banks from lending baht to anyone outside the country. This put short sellers in a bind: They could no longer borrow baht in order to sell them unless they secured the loans offshore at punitive interest rates. Tiger, for example, had financed some of its positions by borrowing baht on a short-term basis, figuring that it could roll over the loans as they came due; now it was forced to renew them at vastly higher interest rates:
“”─“”‘’•“”
p.205
But by doggedly calling the banks that executed the government's sell orders in the forward markets, Jones had pieced together the alarming rate at which real reserves were dwindling. By his reckoning, the Bank of Thailand had used up $21 billion worth of reserves in May alone, a stunning two thirds of its war chest.26
p.206
Over the next three months, it fell by 32 percent against the dollar. The Soros funds gained about $750 million from the devaluation, and Julian Robertson gained perhaps $300 million;29 meanwhile, Thailand's output collapsed by 17 percent from its peak, destroying businesses and jobs and plunging millions into poverty. By an uncanny coincidence, July 1, 1997, was the day when Britain ceded control over Hong Kong.
(More money than god : hedge funds and the making of a new elite / Sebastian Mallaby., 1. hedge funds., 2. investment advisors., HG4530.M249 2010, 332.64'524──dc22, 2010, )
____________________________________
Sebastian Mallaby., More money than god : hedge funds and the making of a new elite, 2010.
pp.249-252
p.249
The original of Tiger's losses went back to the summer, when a confident Julian Robertson had written an upbeat investor letter.
p.249
Robertson had been particularly impressed by the discussion of the yen. Japan was deregulating its financial markets, allowing investors to shift money abroad; and with yen interest rates at just over 1 percent, it seemed obvious that Japanese savers would seize the chance to earn more on their investments.
p.249
As Japanese capital flooded abroad, the yen would head down. Robertson left his investors in no doubt that he would short Japan's currency.
p.249
so Robertson had underestimated the extent to which deleveraging would hit his yen trade.
pp.249-250
Precisely because yet interest rates were low, traders borrowed the Japanese currency to finance their positions around the world; if they dumped those positions and paid their yen back, the currency would be pushed upward ── the opposite of what Robertson was expecting.
p.250
It was the day that Tiger's yen bet started to go wrong. Japan's currency rose 7 percent against the dollar over the next month, and Tiger saw over $1 billion of its capital evaporate.
That was only the start of Tiger's troubles, however. Just as Long-Term was hammered by rivals who knew too much about its positions, so Robertson found himself in a similar predictament.
p.250
The moment that Robertson sent out his July letter, every trader knew he was short Japan's currency; and the more the yen rose, the more they expected him to be forced to staunch his lossses by buying back yen and closing his position.
p.250
On October 7 the yen jumped especially sharply , and traders sensed that Robertson would crack. They drove the yen up still more, calculating that Tiger's compelled exist from its trade would deliver yen holders a handsome profit.
p.250
By around 10:00 A.M. on October 8, 1998, Japan's currency had appreciated by an astonishing 12 percent since the previous morning.
p.250
More than $2 billion of Tiger's equity had gone up in smoke;
p.250
Robertson convened a crisis council of his top lieutenants. They gathered in is splendid corner office, with its panoramic views of Manhattan; but the spectacle that mattered was flashing and blinking in the windowless core of their building, where the trading desk monitored the yen's surge upward.
p.251
By an irony that was no doubt lost on the participants, the man who dominated the crisis council was none other than Michael Bills, the son of the military aviator who had joined Tiger after Tom Wolfe called him and talked about the fighter-pilot culture.
p.251
Bills argued to his colleagues that the market had gone crazy because it thought Tiger was on its knees; if Tiger could show that it still had the right stuff, it could restore Wall Street to its senses.
p.251
Bills proposed that Tiger should attack rather than retreat. Rather than closing out its yen short, as the market expected, it should demonstrate its fearlessness by adding to its bet against Japan's currency. One brave gesture would prove to predatory traders that it was not easy meat. The yen would stop speeding upward.
p.251
Dan Morehead, Tiger's currency trader, hurried to his cockpit to execute the Bills plan. He would add $50 million to Tiger's bet against the yen, gambling that his signal would break the currency's momentum.
p.251
Morehead called a dealer at one of the big banks. He asked for a two-way price on dollar-yen, not wanting to give away whether he was buying or selling. Normally it took a couple of seconds for the bank to quote a price. This time there was a lengthy silence. The expectation that Tiger would soon be fored to buy yen by the billion had scared potential sellers to the sidelines; who wanted to shed yen when Tiger was about to force their price up?
p.251
Because of the dearth of seller, the market had dried up; there were no trades and no prices. Morehead's bank dealer would have to name a price in a vacuum.
p.251
After a fully half a minute, the answer came back. The bank would sell Tiger dollars using an exchange rate of 113.5 yen to the dollar; it would buy dollars back using an exchange rate of 111.5 yen to the dollar. The two-yen gap between the quotes was astronomical ── maybe forty times the spread that Morehead was in a normal market. Like LTCM before it, Tiger was discovering that liquidity can dry up when it's most needed.
p.251
“I buy”, Morehead said.
p.252
In that instant, the bank that took his order knew that Tiger was not going to be squeezed out of its trade. Julian Robertson and his Tigers still had the will to fight! Only a fool would trade against them! Seconds later the dearth of sellers came to an abrupt end: The bank's proprietary traders began dumping yen, and the dumps communicated the sea change to every currency desk on Wall Street. The yen started falling as quickly as it had risen earlier in the day. The aviator's son had won. Tiger had been in a tailspin, but disaster had been averted.3
p.252
; Tiger's debt-to-equity ratio was around five to one, which gave it the muscle to hold on to its yen short rather than getting squeezed out of the position.4 But this vindication was scant comfort to Tiger's partners. During the course of October, Robertson managed to lose $3.1 billion in currencies, primarily from his bet against the yen; and his excuses were not persuasive.
p.252
Tiger had been short an astonishing $18 billion worth of the currency ── a position almost twice as large as Druckenmiller's famous bet against [British] sterling.6
p.252
In the aftermath of this disaster, Robertson promised his investors that he would scale back his currency trading.
“”─“”‘’•“”
p.254
“The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent”, Keynes famously declared. Being early and right is the same as being wrong, as investors have repeatedly discovered.
As the bubble inflated in 1999, Julian Robertson declined to fight it. He had no doubt that technology stocks were way too high, but he had lost money on technology shorts the previous year and had concluded that there was no safe way to bet against the bubble. He was comfortable shorting individual companies, because he could hedge out the risk of a general rise in the market by going long similar stocks. But when the entire technology sector was overvalued, hedging became hard: Robertson couldn't short all tech stocks while going long an equivalent bucket of assets, since there was no such equivalent. Besides, the momentum in the tech bubble seemed almost unstoppable. Robertson likened the NASDAQ to a locomotive hurtling down the tracks. It was certain to come off the rails, but there was no telling when. Only a foll would stand in front of it.10
(More money than god : hedge funds and the making of a new elite / Sebastian Mallaby., 1. hedge funds., 2. investment advisors., HG4530.M249 2010, 332.64'524──dc22, 2010, )
____________________________________
1992 broken the Bank of England
Neil Irwin, The Alchemists : three central bankers and a world on fire, 2013
[pp.72-74]
Behind the thick walls of the Bank of England, the traders were fighting a battle. And they were losing.
They were buying pounds, with furious speed and on a vast scale. First 200 million pounds, then another 300 million pounds. By 8:40 a.m. that morning of Wednesday, September 16, 1992, they were up to 1 billion pounds. They were trying to prop up the value of their currency on global markets, but no matter how many pounds they bought, the numbers on their screens barely budged. What they didn't know was that the night before and an ocean away in New York, financier George Soros had given his chief portfolio manager, Stan Druckenmiller, a remarkable order: Sell [British pound] sterling, as much as you can. And don't stop.
Druckenmiller had concluded that the British government was no longer going to be able to hold its currency at the level it had pledged to two years earlier under the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. The idea was that the nations of Europe could boost their economies if their different currencies maintained a steady value relative to the others'. It would be much easier for a company to do business across Europe, for example, if it could be confident that the deutschmark [German currency] and the franc [French currency] and the lira [Italian currency] wouldn't constantly fluctuate against each other. When, in one of Margaret Thatcher's final acts as prime minister, Britain joined the exchange rate mechanism [ERM], it committed to keeping the value of a pound sterling at 2.95 deutschmarks, plus or minus 6 percent.
But Druckenmiller and Soros were convinced that the underlying value of the pound was in fact below that, amid inflation and weak growth in the UK. They were betting that the currency would inevitably fall to levels that more closely matched its fundamentals, and that the government couldn't afford to keep its value artificially high by entering the market to buy sterling. Finland and Italy had already dropped out of the exchange rate mechanism under just such pressures, sending their currencies plummeting and making vast sums for anyone who had bet accordingly. Mervyn King, then the Bank of England's chief economist, had gone to Frankfurt two days earlier, arriving at the Bundesbank amid Wagnerian bursts of thunder and lighting to plead with it for help maintaining the peg, a trip he later called "probably one of the world's most unsuccessful diplomatic missions." The endgame was coming for Britain.
The two investors decided to sell sterling "short"--that is, to sell borrowed pounds, which they would repay later, after the pound dropped. "Go for the jugular," Soros told Druckenmiller that Tuesday night.
The Quantum Fund, which they ran, sold pounds to anyone who could buy--the Bank of England when the London markets were open, investors around the world the rest of the time. Soon others started to dump sterling too. The Bank of England could keep buying, but the more it bought, the more British taxpayers stood to lose if the nation eventually did abandon its currency peg.
That Wednesday, Prime Minister John Major's government made an emergency decision to hike interest rates a stunning 2 full percentage points, then hiked them by another 3 percentage points on Thursday. It hoped to reverse the sell-off and leave the speculators with egg on their face, even at the risk of devastating British economic growth. But Soros and other global investors showed no hesitation. The selling continued unabated.
At 7:40 p.m. London time the evening of September 17, Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont stood before the British Treasury. "Massive speculative flows have continued to disrupt the functioning of the exchange-rate mechanism," he told the assembled cameras. He had called a meeting of European finance ministers to discuss what to do next. "In the meantime the Government has decided that British's best interests would be best secured by suspending our membership of the ERM with immediate effect."
The pound immediately plummeted. George Soros and Stan Druckenmiller had broken the Bank of England, made a billion dollars for themselves and their investors, and become legends in the world of finance. But the exit of Britain, Italy and Finland from the exchange rate mechanism meant that if the very different nations of Europe were to create a single unified financial system, in which money could flow as freely between nations as it does among U.S. states, it would take something more binding than a mere promise.
It would take the euro.
[p.324]
DEM WAHREN SCHOENEN GUTEN, the inscription on the reconstructioned neo-Renaissance facade reads: "To the true, the beautiful, the good."
(Irwin, Neil (2013), The Alchemists, the penguin press, new york, 2013 )
(The Alchemists : three central bankers and a world on fire, Neil Irwin, pp.72-74 )
____________________________________
- herd mentality
- group think
- band wagon effect
- self-fulfiling prophecy
- feedback loop between:
- the situation (reality - the actual situation),
- perception of reality (interpretation of the situation),
- what you think you know; what you believe to be true;
- omission (non-action) and/or commission (action).
- feedback loop as in interaction
- the interactions influence the behavior of the participants
- watering hole
- a small pond or the shore of a lake where all the animals go to get the only source of water (drinkable water for animal in the wild, not drinkable for human)
- “The Watering Hole is police slang for a location cops go off-duty to blow off steam and talk about work and life.”
- information asymmetry
____________________________________
George Soros, The new paradigm for financial markets, 2008
p.xxiv
One cannot escape the conclusion that both the financial authorities and market participants harbor fundamental misconceptions about the way financial markets function.
p.xxiv
I shall argue that the global financial system has been built on false premises. This would be a shocking proposition except for the even more shocking proposition that misconceptions characterize not only financial markets but all human constructs.
p.xxiv
In Part 1, I shall lay out the conceptual framework in terms of which the functioning of financial markets can be understood. In Part 2, I shall apply that framework to the present moment in history.
p.10
People base their decisions not on the actual situation that confronts them but on their perception or interpretation of that situation. Their decisions make an impact on the situation (the manipulative function), and changes in the situation are liable to change their perceptions (the cognitive function). The two functions operate concurrently, not sequentially.
p.11
They can affect the course of events──the future is influenced by their decisions──but they cannot base their decisions on knowledge. They are obliged to form a view of the world, but that view cannot possibly correspond to the actual state of affairs. Whether they recognize it or not, they are obliged to act on the basis of beliefs which are not rooted in reality. Misinterpretations of reality and other kinds of misconceptions play a much bigger role in determining the course of events than generally recognized. That is the main new insight that the theory of reflexivity has to offer.
p.11
I learned at an early age how ideologies based on false premises can transform reality. I also learned that there are times when the normal rules do not apply, and the abnormal becomes normal.
p.18
In particular, I could apply my theory of reflexivity to establish a disequilibrium scenario or boom-bust pattern for financial markets. The rewarding part came when market enter what I called far-from-equilibrium territory because that is when the generally accepted equilibrium models broke down.
pp.18-19
I specialized in detecting and playing far-from-equilibrium situations with good results.
p.19
This led to my first published book, The Alchemy of Finance (1987), in which I expounded my approach. I called it alchemy to emphasize that my theory does not meet the currently prevailing requirements of scientific method.
p.19
I used to suffer from backaches and other psychosomatic ailments, and I received as many useful signals from my backaches as from my theory. Nevertheless, I attributed great importance to my philosophy and particularly my theory of reflexivity. Indeed, I considered it so significant, treasured it so much, that I found it difficult to part with it by putting it in writing and publishing it.
p.19
As I belabored the points, my arguments became more and more covoluted until I reached a point when I could not understand what I had written the night before.
p.20
At the same time, some readers could look through my faulty rhetoric and appreciate the ideas that lay behind them. That was particularly true for people engaged in the financial markets, where my demonstrated success led them to look for the reason behind it, and the obscurity of my formulations added to their fascination. My publisher anticipated this and refrained from editing my manuscript. He wanted the book to be the subject of a cult. To this day The Alchemy of Finance is read by market participants, taught in business schools, but totally ignored in departments of economics.
pp.20-21
He quoted my son Robert:
My father will sit down and give you theories to explain
why he does this or that. But I remember seeing it as a
kid and thinking, Jesus Christ, at least half of this is bullshit.
I mean, you know the reason he changes his position
on the market or whatever is because his back starts
killing him. It has nothing to do with reason. He literally
goes into a spasm, and it's this early warning sign.
If you're around him a long time, you realize that to a
large extent he is driven by temperament. But he is always
trying to rationalize what are basically his emotions.
And he is living in a constant state of not exactly
denial, but rationalization of his emotional state. And it's
very funny.*
*Quoted in Michael Kaufman, Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 140.
p.21
I harbored grave doubts myself. Although I took my philosophy very seriously, I was not at all certain that what I had to say deserved to be taken seriously by others. I knew that it was significant for me subjectively, but I was uncertain about its objective worth for others.
p.21
The theory of reflexivity deals with a subject──the relationship between thinking and reality──that philosophers had been discussing for ages.
p.21
I felt obliged to keep on explaining my philosophy because I felt it was not properly understood. All my books followed the same pattern.
p.22
I was trying to answer the question, how could the propaganda techniques described in Orwell's 1984 be so successful in contemporary America? After all, in 1984 Big Brother was watching you; there was a Ministry of Truth and an apparatus of repression to take care of dissidents. In contemporary America there is freedom of thought and pluralistic media. Yet the Bush administration managed to mislead the people by using Orwellian Newspeak.
p.22
Until then I had taken it for granted that Orwellian Newspeak could prevail only in a closed society like Orwell's 1984.
p.22
His [Karl Popper] argument hinged on the unspoken assumption that political discourse aims at a better understand of reality. But the concept of reflexivity asserts that there is such a thing as the manipulative (formerly participating) function, and political discourse can be successfully used to manipulate reality.
(The new paradigm for financial markets : the credit crisis of 2008 and what it means / George Soros., 1. financial crises──united states., 2. united states──economic policy., 3. united states──economic conditions──21st century., 4. credit──united states., HB3722.S673 2008, 332.0973──dc22, 2008, )
____________________________________
• the most severe legislation restricting financial speculation of any industrial country of the time.
• Futures positions in grain were prohibited.
• Stock market speculation possibilities were severely constrained, one result of which has been the relative absence of stock market speculation since then as a major factor affecting German economic life.
William Engdahl, A century of war: Anglo-American oil politics and the new world order, 1992, 2004
pdf page: 25/314 (filename: Engdahl_Century_of_War_book.pdf)
pp.14-15
p.14
In 1890, as a result of the near failure of the prestigious London merchant bank, Baring Brothers, arising from their huge losses in Argentine bond speculation and investment, and the ties of German banking to this Argentine speculation, a Berlin bank panic ensured, as the dominoes of an international financial pyramid began to topple.
p.14
Berlin, and German investors generally, had been caught up in international railroad speculation mania in the 1880s. With the crash of the elite Baring Bros., with some $75,000,000 invested in various Argentine bonds, down came the illusions of many Germans about the marvels of financial speculation.
pp.14-15
In the wake of the financial collapse of Argentina, a large wheat exporter to Europe, Berlin grain traders Ritter & Blumenthal had foolishly attempted to ‘corner’ on the entire German wheat market, planning to capitalize on the consequences of the financial troubles in Argentina. This only aggravated the financial panic in Germany as their scheme collapsed, bankrupting in its wake the esteemed private banking house of Hirschfeld & Wolf, and causing huge losses at the Rheinisch-Westphaelische Bank, further triggering a general run on German banks and a collapse of the Berlin stock market, lasting into the autumn of 1891.
p.15
Responding to the crisis, the Chancellor named a Commission of Inquiry of 28 eminent persons, under the chairmanship of Reichsbank President Dr. Richard Koch, to look into the causes and to propose legislative measures to prevent further such panics from occurring. The Koch Commission was composed of a broad and representatives cross-section of German economic society, including representatives from industry, agriculture, universities, political parties, as well as banking and finance.
p.15
The result of the commission's work, most of it voted into law by the Reichstag in the Exchange Act in June 1896, and the Depotgesetz of that July, was the most severe legislation restricting financial speculation of any industrial country of the time. Futures positions in grain were prohibited. Stock market speculation possibilities were severely constrained, one result of which has been the relative absence of stock market speculation since then as a major factor affecting German economic life.
p.15
The German Exchange Act of 1896 established definitively a different form of organization of finance and banking in Germany from that of Britain or America──Anglo-Saxon banking. Not only this, but many London financial houses reduced their activity in the restrictive German financial market after the 1890s as a result of these restrictions, lessening the influence of City of London finance over German economic policy. Significantly, to the present day, these fundamental differences between Anglo-Saxon banking and finance, and a ‘German model’ as largely practiced in Germany, Holland, Switzerland and Japan, are still somewhat visible.3
3. Friedrich List. The National System of Political Economy (1885 edition. London: Longman, Green). Reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966.
William Engdahl, A century of war: Anglo-American oil politics and the new world order, 1992, 2004
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1e0PVSremXnuf4Nkn4cY0xW8hF8SaL72-/view
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1eon-LgnO0xBGwNocDzajA8hELTmWS1CR
____________________________________
<---------------------------------------------------------------------------->
--
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in, or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), without the prior permission of the publisher.
NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C., section 107, some material is provided without permission from the copyright owner, only for purposes of criticism, comment, scholarship and research under the "fair use" provisions of federal copyright laws. These materials may not be distributed further, except for "fair use," without permission of the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml
____________________________________
No comments:
Post a Comment